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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades the structure of financial markets have changed.
In a regime with credit rationing and high transaction costs, the households
ability to diversify its portfolio was slight. The combination of deregulation,
new information technology and new financial products have made financial
markets accessible even to private investors with limited funds.
With the current range of investment opportunities, households should
no longer be constrained with regard to portfolio allocation. This implies
that the framework of financial economics, a literature that traditionally
has focused primarily on the behavior of individuals that can allocate their
money over a wide range of investment goods, to an increasing extent should
apply to the household. As a result of this change one has seen an emerging
interest in the behavior of the household portfolio (see e.g. Guiso, Haliassos
and Jappeli, 2002, a book that sum up much of recent work in the area).
However, despite more investment opportunities, the household portfolio
can still be described as rather one sided. The household portfolio tends
to be dominated by two assets; housing and mortgages. In 2001 the aver-
age Norwegian household held 112 % of net wealth in housing assets. As a
comparison, the same subject held only 10 % of net wealth in equity. Other
interest rate bearing assets made up 16 %, while debt equaled 38 % of net
wealth.1 It seems to be a widely held assumption that this portfolio compo-
sition in part is due to a tax regime that favours housing over other capital
1That being said, the share of equity in the household portfolio has been rising in the
later years, at least in % of household income. In Norway we have seen that the share of
equity to gross income has almost tripled from 1996 to 2001.
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assets, and in part due to constraints forcing households to make a discrete
choice between owning a house—and therefore a large holding of housing
assets—or renting a house.
In this paper we shed more light on why housing is so dominant as an
investment asset. If equity is such a lucrative investment as is often claimed
by financial experts, why do households not use the security of the house to
borrow money for investing in equity? We give special attention to the role
of taxes, and discuss how different forms of housing taxation will affect the
household portfolio composition.
Our study of the implications of tax on housing should clarify the liter-
ature. Relatively few articles have been written on the topic of taxation of
housing. Poterba (1984) discusses the effects of high inflation in a regime
with tax preference on housing assets. His findings imply that higher infla-
tion should lead to a higher share of house ownership, as the tax wedge in-
creases when nominal return increases, while real returns remain unchanged.
However, in a survey article, Poterba (2001) argues that there is still sparse
empirical evidence on how taxes actually affect portfolio behaviour. In a
recent work, Fuest, Huber and Nielsen (2003) present an OLG model to cal-
culate the effects of introducing a capital gains tax on housing. They find
that a capital gains tax could increase (before tax) price volatility in housing
prices.
The method we use is the theory of the portfolio frontier. This is among
the most established parts of financial theory, and the model is well known
and widely applied (see e.g., Huang and Litzenberger, 1988). We apply the
same methodology to understand the portfolio of the household as is applied
4
to understand the portfolio of a professional investor. We construct a port-
folio frontier for a household investing in four assets; housing, equity, bonds
and mortgage; but apply short sale constraints as the household can not go
short in housing, bonds or equity, and not long in mortgages.
We find that the portfolio frontier indicates the same type of portfolio
composition—a high share of housing and a low share of equity—as we ob-
serve in the actual data. This is the case for all reasonable assumptions about
risk aversion. Further, we show that this result also holds in a regime with no
taxes ; implying that the high share of housing in household portfolios is not
primarily driven by the the low tax on housing assets. Rather, we find that
what makes housing so attractive as an investment good is the implied rent
from housing assets. Housing returns a high, stable stream of consumption
services no other financial assets can match.
Last, we find that a higher tax on housing would not necessarily reduce
the holding of housing assets. We discuss two kinds of taxes; a capital gains
tax and a tax on implied rent. We find that introducing a capital gains
tax on housing in line with the capital gains tax on equity can increase the
share of housing assets in the portfolio of the average household. This result
follows as a capital gains tax would reduce the risk of holding housing capital.
However, if one introduces a tax on the implied rent from housing, e.g. in the
form of wealth tax on housing assets, the average household can be expected
to reallocate funds from housing to equity investments.
In section 2 we describe the calculation of the portfolio frontier. We also
discuss how to calibrate the model. In section 3 we compare the calculated
frontier with actual data. In the last section we discuss how shifts in expected
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returns, due to shifts between tax regimes, affect the portfolio for given levels
of risk aversion.
2 Methodology and data
We build our analysis on standard financial theory. First we present the basic
model. We then discuss some issues concerning calibration of the model.
2.1 The mean-variance framework and the portfolio
frontier
A standard assumption in finance is that an investor evaluates a portfolio
based on two criteria; the expected return of the portfolio and the expected
variance of this return. Technically this assumption is only valid under rather
strict restrictions on the utility function. However, the mean-variance as-
sumption makes it possible to obtain testable implications of theory that can
not be obtained under more general forms of utility.
The mean-variance model has been a central piece of financial economics
since it was presented by Markowitz (1952). An important implication of
this model is the portfolio frontier. The mathematics of the portfolio frontier
was first shown in Merton (1972), but has since become a central working
tool in both theoretical and applied finance.
Strictly defined, the mean-variance frontier is the boundary of the set of
means and variances of the returns on all portfolios of a given set of assets.
This boundary can be found by minimizing the variance of return for given
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mean return. There exists a mean-variance frontier as long as there are
two returns not perfectly correlated and yielding different means. A typical
illustration of the mean-variance frontier is displayed in figure 1. The mean-
variance frontier of all risky assets is graphed as the hyperbolic region.
Figure 1: Mean-variance frontier
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If R is a vector of asset returns, E is the vector of mean returns, E=E(R),
and Σ is the variance-covariance matrix, Σ = E[(R − E)(R − E)′], we can
derive the mean-variance frontier using the Lagrangian approach. A portfolio
is defined by its weights on the initial securities. Thus, w′R is the portfolio
return, where the weights sum to one. If I is a vector of ones, we have
w′I = 1. The mean return on the portfolio is given by w′E = µ. Minimizing
variance for a given mean leads to the following minimizing problem:
minimise w′Σw, (1)
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s.t.
w′E = µ and w′I = 1. (2)
For the given mean portfolio return, µ, the variance of the minimum variance
portfolio is then
var(R) =
Cµ2 − 2Bµ+ A
AC −B2 , (3)
and the weights are given by
w = Σ−1
E(Cµ−B) + (A−Bµ)
AC −B2 , (4)
where
A = E ′Σ−1E; B = E ′Σ−1I; C = I ′Σ−1I. (5)
The marginal rate of transformation (between risk and return) is given by
MRT =
Dσ
Aµ−B, (6)
where D = BC − A2, and σ is the standard deviation of the portfolio.
The analytical solution for the mean-variance frontier is based on the
assumption that there are no constraints on the possible position one can
take in any asset. For practical applications this will be a problem. Most
investors will be constrained in their ability to sell an object short. This
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is especially relevant for households. Imposing short sale constraints has
the implications that no analytical solution for the mean-variance frontier
can be derived. When we compute mean-variance frontiers below we use a
programming sub-routine to calculate the optimal portfolios when the short
sale constraints are binding.2
2.2 Risk aversion
In the mean-variance framework, optimal portfolio allocation is defined by
tangency between the indifference curve and the efficient frontier, as shown
in figure 1. The point of tangency is where the marginal rate of substitution
equals the marginal rate of transformation between risk and return.
Under the assumptions of constant relative risk aversion3, normally dis-
tributed portfolio returns with mean µ and variance σ and investors maximiz-
ing expected utility, it can be shown that the marginal rate of substitution
is given by (see e.g. Flavin and Yamashita, 2002, for a reference)
MRS = ρσ. (7)
The risk aversion, ρ, in optimum is then given by
ρ =
D
Aµ−B. (8)
2The program is documented in Harding and Solheim (2004).
3We assume the a utility function on the form U(W ) = 11−ρW
1−ρ, where W is wealth.
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Solving for the return, µ, gives
µ =
1
A
(
D
ρ
+B). (9)
By making assumptions about the households utility function and the
level of risk aversion, we can quantify the optimal portfolio, and thereby
evaluate wether the household’s actual portfolio is close to the optimal port-
folio. Alternatively we can use the actual portfolios to calculate the level of
risk aversion these imply.
2.3 Calibration
In practice households tend to invest in four objects: housing, interest rate
bearing assets, equity and insurance claims. In addition the household can
increase exposure by borrowing to invest. We chose to ignore insurance
claims, as such claims are not very liquid.
As we compare with actual Norwegian portfolios, we use Norwegian data.
One should expect that the relevant mean-variance frontier is based on a
rational forecast of returns. However, it is not clear how to conduct a rational
forecast of returns when making long term investments. Our data on actual
portfolios cover the years 1998 to 2002. To match expectations formed in
this period, we base our analysis on actual return for the period from 1993
to 2002. 1993 is a reasonable starting point, as Norway implemented a major
tax reform in 1992. For equity we use the return on the Oslo Stock Exchange.
For interest rates we use the average rate on debt and short term deposits
respectively, collected from Norges Bank.
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The pre tax return on housing consists of two components. These are
the change in the housing price (capital gain) and the stream of service the
house offers the owner (housing consumption). To measure capital gains we
use the quarterly relative change in the housing price index for self owned
houses. This measurement is imprecise, as we do not fully account for the
fact that house investments are object specific, and that the risk of single
investment is higher than the risk of investing in the general housing index.4
The consumption component is more problematic. Moum (1995) dis-
cusses four different approaches to calculate the stream of service received
from a self owned house. The calculation can be based on: i) the costs of
buying the service, ii) observed rental prices, iii) the costs a rental house
owner is meeting or iv) the social costs of providing housing services. Un-
der perfect competition and no public distortions the four methods should
give the same results. Under a tax regime favoring self owned houses the
methods may give different results. Moum concludes that the best solution
is to calculate the income stream based on rental prices. One weakness with
this approach is the likely lack of representativeness of renters for homeown-
ers. The other methods are however seen as more problematic because they
demand calculations of capital returns. 5
To find consumption return we use estimations from the Norwegian Na-
4Englund, Hwang and Quigley (2002) find the object specific risk to be substantial.
However, it is not clear how much of this variance is due to investments (or neglect of
necessary maintenance) in the given object, and how much is due to factors outside the
control of the owner (like changes in relative demand between different types of housing,
different areas within the community et.c.). To the extent that the owner can control the
relative value of a house, the index would be a relevant reference point.
5An approximation to using data on actual rental cost, is to assume that the stream of
consumption services is a fixed percentage of the house value.
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tional Accounts. These are calculated according to Moum’s preferred ap-
proach. To find the rate of return, we divide the consumption stream on the
total stock of housing capital.
Returns and a correlation matrix are given in table 1. To compare the
model with actual data it is important to use post tax observations. All
returns are therefore returns after tax, where taxes are based on the current
(post 1992) tax regime. We focus on real returns, and use changes in the
CPI as a measure of inflation.
Table 1: Real return after tax: four assets in the household portfolio
Housing Interest Equity Debt
Return 0.11 0.01 0.13 0.03
Standard deviation 0.11 0.01 0.31 0.01
Correlation
Housing 1
Interest -0.19 1
Equity 0.31 -0.09 1
Debt -0.05 0.93 0.04 1
Note: We assume that the household portfolio consists of housing, interest bearing assets, equity and debt.
The table reports the expected return and standard deviation of each asset, and the correlation matrix.
Expected returns are based on actual returns, after tax, quarterly observations, from Norwegian data over
the period 1993:1-2002:2. All numbers in per cent. Real returns are calculated using realised inflation
measured by the CPI. Sources: Norges Bank and Statistics Norway
Note that we ignore transaction costs. The transaction cost of a house
is probably higher than the transaction cost in the other assets. This means
that housing may have slightly too high return in our data. However, even
transaction costs in financial markets are substantial for a non-professional
investor.6
6Buying and selling a share in a mutual fund easily takes up more than 3 % of the
investment. As a comparison, the same transaction in the housing market probably will
cost between 3 and 10 % of the housing value. For housing assets, the share will be higher
for low cost properties, as many of the costs incurred are independent of asset price.
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3 Observed portfolios and optimal portfolios
In this section we first calculate a mean variance frontier for a given set of
post-tax returns from the Norwegian market. We then present some data
on actual portfolios of Norwegian households. We present both the average
household over a number of years, but also a cross section of households
based on the age of the oldest member of the household. In the last part of
the section we compare the observed portfolios with the optimal portfolios.
3.1 The mean variance frontier
Figure 2: Mean variance frontier
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Note: Each portfolio on the mean-variance frontier is associated with a given return and standard devi-
ation. The figure is the real world representation of figure 1. The uneven steepness in the positive and
negative parts of the curve is due to differences with regard to how the short sale constraints are binding.
Based on the return vector and covariance matrix presented in table 1,
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we calculate the mean-variance frontier using the theory presented in section
2. The frontier is presented in figure 2. As we can see, we replicate the form
of figure 1. 7
Table 2: Optimal portfolios - post tax returns
Housing Interest Equity Debt
ρ=2 2.95 0.00 0.19 -2.14
ρ=4 1.48 0.00 0.09 -0.58
ρ=6 0.99 0.00 0.06 -0.06
ρ=8 0.92 0.03 0.05 0.00
ρ=10 0.74 0.22 0.04 0.00
Note: We estimate the mean variance frontier under short sale constraints, based on the returns data
presented in table 1. We report portfolio shares for each asset in the optimal portfolio for four different
levels of risk aversion, ρ. The portfolio shares sum to 1. Negative numbers imply that the investor is
borrowing the asset.
In table 2 we report the actual portfolio shares for five different levels of
risk aversion. Notice that a low risk aversion (low ρ) implies a high willingness
to take risk. We see that the degree of gearing—borrowing money to invest—
is higher for individuals with a low risk aversion. For all levels of risk aversion
it is optimal to hold a high share of housing in the portfolio.
Given the way we define the object vector, it should be no surprise that
the investor either holds interest bearing assets or debt, but not both at the
same time. There is no premium on liquidity here. In Norway, household
debt tend to have a floating rate. There is a close correlation between the
interest rate on debt and the interest rate on interest bearing assets.8 As a
result, there is no gain in holding interest rate bearing assets as long as one
7The curve seems to be much steeper for the part of the frontier below the minimum
variance portfolio. This is due to the short sale constraints. The short sale constraints do
not bind if one wants to minimise return—the best way to do so is to borrow money and
place the proceeds in interest rate bearing assets.
8The correlation is not perfect, as the changes in the interest on debt tend to lag
changes on interest bearing assets. This is due to regulations on notification.
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holds debt.
3.2 The portfolio of the Norwegian household
Table 3: Actual portfolio shares—average Norwegian household
Housing Interest Equity Debt
1998 1.17 0.00 0.13 -0.30
1999 1.14 0.00 0.15 -0.28
2000 1.13 0.00 0.12 -0.25
2001 1.12 0.00 0.10 -0.22
2002 1.17 0.00 0.08 -0.25
Note: Table reports the portfolio shares of the average Norwegian household in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001
and 2002. The data are calculated based on the household survey of Statistics Norway, and underlying
data are collected from Norwegian tax returns.
Housing assets are estimated at market price. We report only net holdings of interest rate bearing assets,
i.e. the sum of interest bearing assets and debt. Equity is holdings of Norwegian equity. Sources: Statistics
Norway, own calculations.
Data on actual portfolios are collected from the household survey of
Statistics Norway. Statistics Norway collects data from about 20 000 house-
holds every year, and compiles data on income and wealth based on filed tax
returns of household members.
The survey includes holdings of real capital, financial capital and debt.
We can distinguish real property from other real capital, but not general
property from housing. From surveys on individual tax statements we do
however know that housing makes up approximately 70 % of real property.9
In the following we assume “real property” to be “housing”. Housing value
is estimated at market terms.10
9Data from the Norwegian tax return statistics, 2001.
10The numbers on housing reported in the survey are “taxable wealth”. Statistics Nor-
way has calculations on the relationship between taxable housing wealth and the housing
wealth at market prices. It is found that the ratio of taxable value to market value was
0.31 in 1995, and 0.20 in 1999. Using 1995 as the base year, we find that the change from
1995 to 1999 can be explained if we assume that the tax assessment of housing wealth
remained unchanged, while housing prices rose in line with the housing price index. To
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For financial assets we distinguish between interest rate bearing assets and
equity. Interest rate bearing assets is defined as holdings of bank deposits plus
bonds. Equity include all holdings of Norwegian equity, including holdings
of mutual funds. We do not distinguish registered from unregistered shares.
For shares not registered on the Oslo Stock Exchange the stock value is
calculated as 65 % of total sales of the company.
Table 3 reports asset holdings as share of net wealth for the average
household for the years 1998-2002. We report only net holdings of debt
and interest rate bearing assets. The table confirms the impression that the
average household holds a high share of wealth in housing.
Table 4: Actual portfolio shares—age groups, 2001
Housing Interest Equity Debt
u25 2.64 0.00 0.30 -1.94
u35 2.28 0.00 0.19 -1.47
u45 1.45 0.00 0.11 -0.56
u55 1.10 0.00 0.14 -0.24
u67 0.94 0.00 0.09 -0.02
u80 0.81 0.15 0.05 0.00
o80 0.73 0.24 0.03 0.00
Note: Table reports the portfolio shares of the average household in seven age groups. 17-24, 25-34, 35-44,
45-54, 55-66, 67-80 and above 80. Age is based on the oldest person in the household. 67 is the official
age of retirement in Norway. The data are calculated based on the household survey of Statistics Norway,
and underlying data are collected from Norwegian tax returns.
Housing assets are estimated at market price. We report only net holdings of interest rate bearing assets,
i.e. the sum of interest bearing assets and debt. Equity is holdings of Norwegian equity.
Statistics Norway also collects data on asset exposure where it differenti-
ates between different age groups. There are seven groups; age 17-24 (u25),
25-34 (u35), 35-44 (u45), 45-54 (u55), 55-66 (u67), 67-80 (u80), and 80+
go from taxable wealth to market prices we therefore use the formula
Market value =
taxable value ∗HPI
0.31
, (10)
where HPI is the housing price index, standardized to the value 1 in 1995.
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(o80). The age of 67 is the official age for retirement in Norway.11
As we can see from table 4, both the share of housing, the share of debt
and the share of equity tend to be age dependent. The young hold a high
share of housing and a high share of debt; the old are net holders of interest
bearing assets, and hold a lower share of total wealth in housing assets.
3.3 Optimal versus actual portfolios
Table 5: Actual shares versus optimal shares—root of summed squared dif-
ferences
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
ρ=4 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.45
ρ=4.5 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.21
ρ=5 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.02
ρ=5.5 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.14
ρ=6 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.27
Note: To compare actual and optimal portfolios, we calculate the root of the sum of squared differences.
The table reports these results for five different levels of risk aversion (ρ). For all five years, best fit is
achieved at risk aversion equal to 5. A high ρ implies a high risk aversion.
In table 5 we compare actual and optimal portfolios. Of course, we do
not know the risk aversion of the average household. So it is impossible to
say how well the optimal portfolio really fits the actual data. Instead we
compare the actual portfolios with optimal portfolios at different levels of
risk aversion. We find that the average household portfolio seems to best
match an optimal portfolio with risk aversion 5.12
Convex absolute risk tolerance should imply that the young, having more
11Like in most other countries actual average age of retirement is lower. Age is based
on oldest household member.
12A risk aversion of 0 implies risk neutrality. Estimates of risk aversion often range from
2-4. Values above 10 is seen as implausible. However, according to Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2000), p. 263, a risk aversion of 27 is necessary to justify the equity premium puzzle.
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Table 6: Actual versus optimal, 2001
u25 u35 u45 u55 u67 u80 o80
ρ=2 0.38 0.95 2.18 2.66 2.93 3.04 3.10
ρ=2.5 0.53 0.10 1.32 1.80 2.07 2.18 2.24
ρ=4 1.80 1.20 0.04 0.51 0.78 0.90 0.98
ρ=5.5 2.38 1.78 0.55 0.11 0.20 0.35 0.45
ρ=6.5 2.59 1.99 0.76 0.30 0.04 0.20 0.32
ρ=9 2.68 2.08 0.86 0.40 0.19 0.02 0.13
ρ=10.5 2.77 2.17 0.97 0.54 0.35 0.15 0.03
Note: To compare actual and optimal portfolios, we calculate the root of the sum of squared differences.
The table reports these results for five different levels of risk aversion (ρ). As we can see, best fit will vary
between age groups. As a rule, the older are more risk averse than the younger. A high ρ implies a high
risk aversion.
periods to invest over, should be more willing to invest in risky assets. How-
ever, one can argue that the household looks not only at the risk of investing
financial capital; it needs to take into account human capital as well. In gen-
eral the household tends to transform human capital into financial capital
over time. So financial capital should be expected to increase with age, while
potential human capital diminish.
One might argue that holding most of ones wealth as human capital makes
total capital stock more risky. If so, the young should be less willing to invest
their financial assets in risky assets than the old. On the other hand, the
ability to get a better paid job or a new job if the current job is lost will
probably decrease with age. So risk related to human capital might actually
increase with age. If this is the case, willingness to invest financial capital in
risky assets should fall with age.
The data do however seem clear. As we can see in table 6, the portfolios
of the young tend to fit optimal portfolios with a low risk aversion, while
the portfolios of the old tend to look like optimal portfolios with a high risk
aversion.
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4 Tax and the optimal portfolio
It is often discussed how taxes affect the share of housing in the household
portfolio. Many economists seem to believe that households hold a high share
of housing due to the fact that housing assets tend to be less taxed than other
investment assets. However, we do not find full support for this argument.
Even in a regime with no taxes on any capital assets the household should
hold a high share of net wealth in housing.
We also test explicitly for the effects of different tax regimes. We compare
the effects of imposing a capital gains tax versus a wealth tax on housing.
We begin the section with a more detailed discussion of return on housing.
4.1 The return to housing revisited
Table 7: Real pre tax return on housing
Housing Capital gains Consumption
Return 0.12 0.06 0.04
Standard deviation 0.11 0.11 0.02
Correlation
Interest -0.23 -0.26 0.27
Equity 0.31 0.26 0.27
Debt -0.07 -0.17 0.63
Note: The table reports real, pre tax return on housing, and the two components of real return, implicit
consumption and capital gains. Note that as all numbers are real returns, the return from capital gains
and consumption do not add up to pre tax total return on housing.
To understand the effect of taxes on the household portfolio we need to
decompose housing returns into household consumption income and capital
gains income, as discussed in the previous section. This is necessary, as these
two returns are very different of nature.
In table 7 we report the two types of return on housing. As one can
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see, while the standard deviation of capital gains from housing is high, the
standard deviation from housing consumption is low. Further, while capital
gains are negatively correlated with the cost of debt, the consumption income
from housing is strongly positively correlated with the cost of debt (0.63).
This is due to a positive correlation between the cost of rental and the interest
rate—as the cost of holding a home increases, the cost of renting the home
will increase as well. A result is that the consumption return works as a
hedge on borrowing costs. If the cost of borrowing rises, implicit return of
holding a house, and thereby the consumption return, rises as well. As will
be clear below, this distinction is important if we want to understand how
taxes affect the household portfolio.
4.2 Tax shifts
We begin by comparing the optimal portfolio using pre and post tax returns.
We then compare different types of tax on housing returns. We look at a
capital gains tax and a wealth tax. A wealth tax would be a de facto tax on
housing consumption.
4.2.1 Is the high share of housing in the household portfolio due
to low tax on housing?
Table 8 reports the optimal portfolio for a fixed risk aversion, set at ρ = 4,
under different assumptions of risk aversion. The first row reports the optimal
portfolio under a no-tax regime, and the second row an optimal portfolio
assuming 28 % tax on capital gains from equity investments and interest
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Table 8: Optimal portfolio shares—different tax regimes
ρ=4 Housing Interest Equity Debt
No tax 1.22 0.00 0.09 -0.31
Base 1.66 0.00 0.07 -0.73
Capital gains tax 2.30 0.00 0.06 -1.36
Consumption tax 1.33 0.00 0.12 -0.45
Note: Table reports optimal portfolio shares under short sale constraints. All portfolios reported are
calculated for a risk aversion of ρ=4.
No tax: we use real, before tax returns on all assets.
Base: No tax on housing return, 28 % tax flat on all other capital return, full interest payment deduction.
Capital gains tax: 28 % tax on capital gains in housing, no tax on housing consumption. Other taxes as
above.
Consumption tax: 28 % tax on housing consumption, no tax on capital gains from housing. Other taxes
as above.
bearing assets, 28 % tax deduction on all debt payments, and no tax on
housing.13
The share of housing, and the share of debt, are both lower in the no-tax
regime. However, the share of housing is still very high. A shift to a no-tax
regime only results in a small shift from housing to other investment assets.
The primary effect is a reduction in gearing—a reduction in the willingness
to borrow to invest in housing.
4.2.2 Capital gains tax on housing
To tax capital gains from housing would be to treat housing like an invest-
ment asset. Capital gain is in general taxed at date of realisation. Prior
studies of capital gains taxes on housing include Fuest et al. (2003). They
argue that such a tax might increase the pre-tax volatility of housing prices.
We impose a 28 % tax on capital gains—in line with tax on capital gains
1328 % is the flat tax rate on capital income used in Norway.
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on other assets.14 The other objects are taxed as in the base-scenario. The
optimal portfolio for a risk aversion of 4 is reported in table 8.
An interesting result emerges. In our estimations the share of housing in
the optimal portfolio will rise following the imposition of capital gains tax on
housing. A capital gains tax reduces the risk of a housing investment, while
the return on housing investments remain high (as the consumption stream
is not affected).
Important here is the relation between risk and return. A capital gains
tax imply that the government takes on part of the risk of the investment.
This makes it even more favorable to borrow money at a relatively low rate,
and invest the money in housing assets. The main impact of a capital gains
tax on housing in our estimations is therefore increased gearing.
How do this tax affect different groups? In calculations where we compare
the impact on different levels of risk aversion (not reported), we find that the
share of housing rises more in the high risk portfolio than in the low risk
portfolio. Given that the young tend to be “high risk”, this implies that a
capital gains tax on housing could lead to an even higher exposure to housing
among the young.
4.2.3 Wealth tax on housing
Next we impose a tax on the consumption income of housing. Again, the
other objects are treated as in the base scenario. We implement this tax as
14Note that we here implement a capital gains tax as a “house index tax”—the tax
applies to the increase in the housing price index from date of purchase to the date of a
sale. This removes the problem of assessing “price gains” from “returns on investment”
for the property.
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a 28 % tax on the implied rent. The effects of a tax on housing consumption
(but no capital gains tax on housing) are again presented in table 8. We find
that such a tax would significantly reduce the share of housing in the optimal
portfolio. Further, the share of other risky assets, i.e. equity, would rise.
An interesting question is how to implement a tax on housing consump-
tion. In Norway the practice has been to add a share of housing value to
income. This is not necessarily a good solution if income tax is progres-
sive. Adding housing consumption to income will affect the marginal tax on
income.
There is a possible alternative. As discussed above, the consumption level
of housing can approximately be estimated as a share of housing value. A tax
on housing wealth would therefore equal tax on housing consumption. As the
value of housing can be distinguished from other types of wealth, one could
even differentiate the wealth tax on housing assets and other capital assets.
It is possible to think of a system with a wealth tax, but no capital gains
tax on housing, and a capital gains tax, but no wealth tax on other capital
assets. The tax proposed here; i.e. a 28 % tax on housing consumption,
would approximate a 0.7 % wealth tax on housing wealth at market value.15
4.2.4 The mean-variance frontier
In figure 3 we plot the mean-variance frontier for the no-tax on housing
regime, and the two regimes with tax on housing. The mean-variance frontier
reports all optimal choices of return and variance for obtainable portfolios.
We see that the mean-variance frontier with a capital gains tax on housing is
15This follows if one assumes the implied rent on housing to be 4 % of housing value.
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Figure 3: Mean variance frontier: Three shifts
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Note: The figure depicts the mean variance frontier for different regimes of housing taxation (equivalent
to those reported in table 8):
No tax on housing: No tax on housing return, 28 % tax flat on all other capital return, full interest
payment deduction.
28 % tax on capital gains from housing: 28 % tax on capital gains in housing, no tax on housing con-
sumption. Other taxes as above.
28 % tax on housing consumption: 28 % tax on housing consumption, no tax on capital gains from
housing. Other taxes as above.
to the left of the mean-variance frontier with no capital gains tax on housing.
This implies that in our estimations the opportunity set of choices between
risk and return is actually larger with a capital gains tax than without. Given
our set of input, for a given standard deviation on the return, the household
can obtain a higher expected return in a regime with a capital gains tax on
housing. This result may of course not be general, but it illustrates that a
positive tax can increase the expected return for a given variance.
5 Conclusion
Households tend to keep a substantial share of their capital in housing assets.
In this article we have shown that given that households use historical returns
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to assess future returns, and that they use the mean-variance framework to
find their optimal portfolios, this is a perfectly rational solution. Further, we
have shown that the high share of housing is not a result of the low tax on
housing (although it increases the share of housing somewhat)—households
hold a large share of housing primarily because housing offers a steady and
not very volatile source of return, in the form of housing consumption.
This finding gives the key to understand how taxes can be used to affect
the housing market. If one wants to reduce the holding of housing, both
relative to net wealth and relative to other assets, one needs to tax housing
consumption, e.g. in the form of a wealth tax on housing. Such a tax would
bring down demand for housing, and probably lead to a fall in housing prices.
A capital gains tax on housing might actually make housing assets more
lucrative, as such a tax would reduce the risk of investing in housing assets.
Demand for housing will increase, and housing prices will probably rise.
Of course, it is important to be aware that there are considerable practical
problems concerning taxation on housing. The most important is the ques-
tion of valuation. As houses are individual objects, it is in general difficult
to asses market value on a year-to-year basis. Such questions have not been
discussed here—we assume that market value is measurable in the form of a
housing price index. This assumption clearly needs more research. Further,
there are other practical problems. E.g., for many house owners, a capital
gains tax would imply that taxes are paid infrequently, but that the amounts
paid might be substantial. This might cause some practical problems with
regard to collecting this tax. Even more difficult may be to differentiate
capital gains from return on investments (or lack of investments) that have
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taken place between date of purchase and date of sale. This might be an
argument for a wealth tax instead of a capital gains tax, using market value
assessed by a housing index.
Despite these problems, housing remains a taxed item in most countries.
Given the current degree of capital flight, the importance of housing as a
taxable asset may well increase in the years to come. However, very few
articles have even attempted to spell out how taxes can be expected to affect
the housing market. In this respect, this paper fills a hole. The simple model
used here gives policymakers a powerful tool to apply in their analysis.
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